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Return to service of the Boeing 737 MAX
Marc Lacoste: split from Boeing 737 MAX groundings
<section begin=summary/>
[[File:Boeing 737-8 MAX N8704Q rotated.jpg|thumb|The [[Boeing 737 MAX]] needs to be certified again]]
After the [[Boeing 737 MAX groundings|Boeing 737 MAX was grounded]], [[National aviation authority|aviation authorities]] need to reassess the aircraft [[type certification]] before allowing it to return to service.
By convention, aviation regulators worldwide accept the certification of aircraft from the country of manufacture and do not review those certifications in much detail.<ref name=":11"></ref> However, since the fatal accidents and grounding of 737 MAX several aviation authorities, particularly the European EASA, will conduct their assessments and validation tests of the MAX prior to authorizing it in their controlled airspace. As of October 2019 the disagreements over various system revision details as well as Level of Involvement (LoI) between the two leading aviation authorities, FAA and EASA, could delay the 737 MAX return to service.<ref name="EASA on proposed fixes" />
<section end=summary/>
== FAA ==
<!-- only information relevant to MAX's return to service -->
In August 2019, reports of friction between Boeing Co. and international air-safety authorities emerged. A Boeing briefing was stopped short by the FAA, EASA, and other regulators, who complained that Boeing had "failed to provide technical details and answer specific questions about modifications in the operation of MAX flight-control computers."<ref></ref><ref></ref> A U.S. official confirmed frustration with some of Boeing's answers.<ref name=":29">Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
On September 18, 2019, FAA administrator [[Stephen Dickson (executive)|Stephen Dickson]] (who had succeeded [[Daniel Elwell]]) said that he would not certify the MAX until he flew the aircraft himself (Dickson had previously been a pilot for Delta Air Lines and operated the Boeing 737).<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref><ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref> He said he will fly the plane using the new software following the certification flight.<ref name="cnn.com"></ref>
In October 2019, the FAA has requested Boeing to turn over internal documents and explain why it did not disclose the Forkner messages earlier.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref> The FAA is aware of "more potentially damaging messages from Boeing employees that the company has not turned over to the agency".<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
On December 11, 2019, Dickson announced that MAX would not be recertified before 2020, and reiterated that FAA did not have a timeline.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref><ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref> The following day, Dickson met with Boeing chief executive Dennis Muilenburg to discuss Boeing's unrealistic timeline and the FAA's concerns that Boeing's public statements may be perceived as attempting to force the FAA into quicker action.<ref></ref>
In January 2020, Boeing targeted mid-2020 for recertification, but the FAA expressed that it was "pleased" with progress made and may approve the aircraft sooner within the United States.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
In February 2020, the FAA explained why the agency waited for [[empirical evidence]] to draw a common link to the crashes before grounding the airplane.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 2, expected 1)</ref> It also set out the remaining steps in the process to ungrounding the aircraft: after remaining minor issues are resolved, a certification flight will be conducted and flight data will be assessed. Operational validation, including assessment of Boeing's training proposals by international and U.S. crews, as well as by the FAA administrator and his deputy in person, will then proceed, followed by documentation steps. The grounding order is expected to be rescinded no less than 30 days after the certification flight, though the FAA stressed again that it was working to a process, not a timeline. U.S. airlines will then need to obtain FAA approval for their training programs. Each aircraft will be issued with an airworthiness certificate and will be required to conduct a validation flight without passengers.<ref></ref>
== EASA ==
The EASA and [[Transport Canada]] announced they will independently verify FAA recertification of the 737 MAX.<ref name=":11" /><ref></ref>
For product certifications, the EASA is already in the process of significantly changing its approach to the definition of Level of Involvement (LoI) with Design Organisations. Based on an assessment of risk, an applicant makes a proposal for the Agency's involvement "in the verification of the compliance demonstration activities and data". EASA considers the applicant's proposal in determining its LOI.<ref></ref><ref></ref><ref></ref>
In a letter sent to the FAA on April 1, 2019, EASA stated four conditions for recertification: "1. Design changes proposed by Boeing are EASA approved (no delegation to FAA) 2. Additional and broader independent design review has been satisfactorily completed by EASA 3. Accidents of JT610 and ET302 are deemed sufficiently understood 4. B737 MAX flight crews have been adequately trained."<ref name=":14"></ref>
In a May 22 statement, the EASA reaffirmed the need to independently certify the 737 MAX software and pilot training.<ref></ref> In addition to system analysis mentioned above, EASA raised concerns with the autopilot not engaging or disengaging upon request, or that the manual trim wheel is electronically counteracted upon, or requires substantial physical force to overcome the aerodynamic effects in flight.<ref></ref>
In September 2019, the European Union received parliamentary questions for written answers about the independent testing and re-certification of critical parts of the Boeing 737 MAX by the EASA:<ref>[https://ift.tt/2uY8lOr European Parliament legal notice for reuse]</ref><blockquote>
* Could the Commission confirm whether these tests will extend beyond the MCAS flight software issue to the real problem of the aerodynamic instability flaw which the MCAS software was created to address?
* Does the Commission have concerns about the limited scope of the FAA's investigation into the fatal loss of control, and is EASA basing its re-certification of the 737 Max on that investigation?
* What assurances can the Commission give that the de facto delegation of critical elements of aircraft certification to the same company that designed and built the aircraft, and the practice of delegated oversight, does not exist in Europe?</blockquote>
EASA stated it was satisfied with changes to the flight control computer architecture; improved crew procedures and training are considered a simplification but still work in progress; the integrity of the angle of attack system is still not appropriately covered by Boeing's response. The EASA recommends a flight test to evaluate aircraft performance with and without the MCAS.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref><ref name=":14" /><ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref> EASA said it will send its own test pilots and engineers to fly certification flight tests of the modified 737 MAX. EASA also said it prefers a design that takes readings from three independent Angle of Attack sensors.<ref name=":18">Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref> EASA's leaders want Boeing and the FAA to commit for longer-term safety enhancements. Mr. Ky is said to seek a third source of the angle of attack. EASA is contemplating the installation of a third sensor or equivalent system at a later stage, once the planes return to service.<ref name="EASA on proposed fixes"></ref>
On 18 October, EASA Executive Director Patrick Ky said: "For me it is going to be the beginning of next year, if everything goes well. As far as we know today, we have planned for our flight tests to take place in mid-December which means decisions on a return to service for January, on our side".<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
== Other authorities ==
<!-- Canada's regulator -->
Canada accepted FAA's MAX certification in June 2017 under a bilateral agreement.<ref name=":17"></ref> However, Canadian Minister of Transport Garneau said in March 2019, that Transport Canada will do its own certification of Boeing's software update "even if it's certified by the FAA.".<ref name=":17" /> On October 4, 2019, the head of civil aviation for Transport Canada, said that global regulators are considering the requirements for the 737 MAX to fly again, weighing in the "startle factors" that can overwhelm pilots lacking sufficient exposure in simulation scenarios. He also said that Transport Canada raised questions over the architecture of the angle of attack system.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref> On November 19, 2019, an engineering manager in aircraft integration and safety assessment at Transport Canada emailed FAA, EASA and Brazil's National Civil Aviation Agency, calling for removal of key software from the 737 MAX by stating "The only way I see moving forward at this point is that Boeing's MCAS system has to go," although the views were at the working level and had not been subject to systematic review by Transport Canada.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
<!-- India's regulator -->
India's regulator [[Directorate General of Civil Aviation (India)|DGCA]] will conduct its own validation tests of the MAX before authorizing it in India's airspace. Arun Kumar, Director General of DGCA, said India will adopt a "wait and watch" policy and not hurry to reauthorize the plane to fly. He also said an independent validation will be performed to ensure safety and MAX pilots will have to train on a simulator. India's [[SpiceJet]] has already received 13 MAX jets and has 155 more on order.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref><ref></ref>
<!-- UAE's regulator -->
The UAE's director general of the [[General Civil Aviation Authority]] (GCAA), Said Mohammed al-Suwaidi, announced GCAA will conduct its own assessment, rather than follow the FAA. The UAE regulator had yet not seen Boeing's fixes in detail.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref> He did not expect the 737 MAX to be back in service in 2019.<ref></ref>
<!-- Australia's regulator -->
Australia's [[Civil Aviation Safety Authority]] said that the FAA decision would be an important factor in allowing the MAX to fly, but CASA will make its own decision.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref> In October 2019 [[SilkAir]] flew its six 737 MAXs from [[Singapore Changi Airport|Singapore]] to [[Alice Springs Airport]] for storage during Singapore's wet season.<ref>[https://ift.tt/2oOfxcr Alice Springs plane graveyard to house Silk Air's grounded Boeing 737 MAX 8 planes] ''[[ABC News (Australia)]]'' October 1, 2019</ref>
<!-- Brazil's regulator -->
According to the first Brazil's government statement on the MAX issue, the [[National Civil Aviation Agency of Brazil]] (ANAC) has been working closely with the FAA on getting the airplane back into service by the end of 2019. It is worth noting that Brazil's largest domestic airline, [[Gol Transportes Aéreos]], is a major MAX customer with an order over 100 aircraft.<ref></ref>
== Certification activities ==
In early October, CEO Muilenburg said that Boeing's own test pilots had completed more than 700 flights with the MAX.<ref name="EASA on proposed fixes" /> As of October 28, Boeing had conducted "over 800 test and production flights with the updated MCAS software, totaling more than 1,500 hours".<ref></ref>
Certification flight tests, because of the ongoing safety review, are unlikely before November.<ref name="Reuters">Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
Boeing made "dry runs" of the certification test flights on October 17, 2019.<ref> Aviation}}</ref>
In December 2019, ''The Air Current'' reported on pilots attempting the procedure with "inconsistent, confusing" results.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
The FAA has identified new risks of failure during thorough testing. As a result, Boeing will make the overall flight-control computer more redundant and both computers will operate on each flight instead of alternating between flights. The planes were said to be unlikely to resume operations until 2020.<ref name="WSJ_20190802"></ref><ref name="WSJ_20190714"></ref><ref name="Seattle Times 20190801">Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref> On October 8, Boeing was fixing a flaw discovered in the redundant-computer architecture of the 737 MAX flight-control system.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
, the FAA and the EASA were still reviewing changes to the MAX software, raising questions about the return to service forecast. The FAA will review Boeing's "final system description", which specifies the architecture of the flight control system and the changes that Boeing have made, and perform an "integrated system safety analysis"; the updated avionics will be assessed for pilot workload.<ref name="Reuters"/> The FAA is specifically looking at six "non-normal" checklists that could be resequenced or changed. The assessment of these checklists with pilots could happen at the end of October, according to an optimistic forecast.<ref name=":35">Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
Final simulator-based assessments are expected to start in November.<ref name="cnn.com"/> On October 22, FAA Administrator Steve Dickson said in news conference that the agency has received the "final software load" and "complete system description" of revisions; several weeks of work are anticipated for certification activities.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
As of mid-November, Boeing still needed to complete an audit of its software documentation. A key certification test flight will follow the audit. In a memo and a video dated November 14, FAA's Steve Dickson instructed his staff to "take whatever time is needed" in their review, repeating that approval is "not guided by a calendar or schedule."<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref><ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
On December 6, 2019, the FAA posted an updated [[Master minimum equipment list]] for the 737 MAX; in particular, both flight computers must be operational before flight, as they now compare each other's sensors prior to activating MCAS.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
== References ==
[[Category:2019 in aviation]]
[[Category:Boeing]]
[[File:Boeing 737-8 MAX N8704Q rotated.jpg|thumb|The [[Boeing 737 MAX]] needs to be certified again]]
After the [[Boeing 737 MAX groundings|Boeing 737 MAX was grounded]], [[National aviation authority|aviation authorities]] need to reassess the aircraft [[type certification]] before allowing it to return to service.
By convention, aviation regulators worldwide accept the certification of aircraft from the country of manufacture and do not review those certifications in much detail.<ref name=":11"></ref> However, since the fatal accidents and grounding of 737 MAX several aviation authorities, particularly the European EASA, will conduct their assessments and validation tests of the MAX prior to authorizing it in their controlled airspace. As of October 2019 the disagreements over various system revision details as well as Level of Involvement (LoI) between the two leading aviation authorities, FAA and EASA, could delay the 737 MAX return to service.<ref name="EASA on proposed fixes" />
<section end=summary/>
== FAA ==
<!-- only information relevant to MAX's return to service -->
In August 2019, reports of friction between Boeing Co. and international air-safety authorities emerged. A Boeing briefing was stopped short by the FAA, EASA, and other regulators, who complained that Boeing had "failed to provide technical details and answer specific questions about modifications in the operation of MAX flight-control computers."<ref></ref><ref></ref> A U.S. official confirmed frustration with some of Boeing's answers.<ref name=":29">Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
On September 18, 2019, FAA administrator [[Stephen Dickson (executive)|Stephen Dickson]] (who had succeeded [[Daniel Elwell]]) said that he would not certify the MAX until he flew the aircraft himself (Dickson had previously been a pilot for Delta Air Lines and operated the Boeing 737).<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref><ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref> He said he will fly the plane using the new software following the certification flight.<ref name="cnn.com"></ref>
In October 2019, the FAA has requested Boeing to turn over internal documents and explain why it did not disclose the Forkner messages earlier.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref> The FAA is aware of "more potentially damaging messages from Boeing employees that the company has not turned over to the agency".<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
On December 11, 2019, Dickson announced that MAX would not be recertified before 2020, and reiterated that FAA did not have a timeline.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref><ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref> The following day, Dickson met with Boeing chief executive Dennis Muilenburg to discuss Boeing's unrealistic timeline and the FAA's concerns that Boeing's public statements may be perceived as attempting to force the FAA into quicker action.<ref></ref>
In January 2020, Boeing targeted mid-2020 for recertification, but the FAA expressed that it was "pleased" with progress made and may approve the aircraft sooner within the United States.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
In February 2020, the FAA explained why the agency waited for [[empirical evidence]] to draw a common link to the crashes before grounding the airplane.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 2, expected 1)</ref> It also set out the remaining steps in the process to ungrounding the aircraft: after remaining minor issues are resolved, a certification flight will be conducted and flight data will be assessed. Operational validation, including assessment of Boeing's training proposals by international and U.S. crews, as well as by the FAA administrator and his deputy in person, will then proceed, followed by documentation steps. The grounding order is expected to be rescinded no less than 30 days after the certification flight, though the FAA stressed again that it was working to a process, not a timeline. U.S. airlines will then need to obtain FAA approval for their training programs. Each aircraft will be issued with an airworthiness certificate and will be required to conduct a validation flight without passengers.<ref></ref>
== EASA ==
The EASA and [[Transport Canada]] announced they will independently verify FAA recertification of the 737 MAX.<ref name=":11" /><ref></ref>
For product certifications, the EASA is already in the process of significantly changing its approach to the definition of Level of Involvement (LoI) with Design Organisations. Based on an assessment of risk, an applicant makes a proposal for the Agency's involvement "in the verification of the compliance demonstration activities and data". EASA considers the applicant's proposal in determining its LOI.<ref></ref><ref></ref><ref></ref>
In a letter sent to the FAA on April 1, 2019, EASA stated four conditions for recertification: "1. Design changes proposed by Boeing are EASA approved (no delegation to FAA) 2. Additional and broader independent design review has been satisfactorily completed by EASA 3. Accidents of JT610 and ET302 are deemed sufficiently understood 4. B737 MAX flight crews have been adequately trained."<ref name=":14"></ref>
In a May 22 statement, the EASA reaffirmed the need to independently certify the 737 MAX software and pilot training.<ref></ref> In addition to system analysis mentioned above, EASA raised concerns with the autopilot not engaging or disengaging upon request, or that the manual trim wheel is electronically counteracted upon, or requires substantial physical force to overcome the aerodynamic effects in flight.<ref></ref>
In September 2019, the European Union received parliamentary questions for written answers about the independent testing and re-certification of critical parts of the Boeing 737 MAX by the EASA:<ref>[https://ift.tt/2uY8lOr European Parliament legal notice for reuse]</ref><blockquote>
* Could the Commission confirm whether these tests will extend beyond the MCAS flight software issue to the real problem of the aerodynamic instability flaw which the MCAS software was created to address?
* Does the Commission have concerns about the limited scope of the FAA's investigation into the fatal loss of control, and is EASA basing its re-certification of the 737 Max on that investigation?
* What assurances can the Commission give that the de facto delegation of critical elements of aircraft certification to the same company that designed and built the aircraft, and the practice of delegated oversight, does not exist in Europe?</blockquote>
EASA stated it was satisfied with changes to the flight control computer architecture; improved crew procedures and training are considered a simplification but still work in progress; the integrity of the angle of attack system is still not appropriately covered by Boeing's response. The EASA recommends a flight test to evaluate aircraft performance with and without the MCAS.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref><ref name=":14" /><ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref> EASA said it will send its own test pilots and engineers to fly certification flight tests of the modified 737 MAX. EASA also said it prefers a design that takes readings from three independent Angle of Attack sensors.<ref name=":18">Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref> EASA's leaders want Boeing and the FAA to commit for longer-term safety enhancements. Mr. Ky is said to seek a third source of the angle of attack. EASA is contemplating the installation of a third sensor or equivalent system at a later stage, once the planes return to service.<ref name="EASA on proposed fixes"></ref>
On 18 October, EASA Executive Director Patrick Ky said: "For me it is going to be the beginning of next year, if everything goes well. As far as we know today, we have planned for our flight tests to take place in mid-December which means decisions on a return to service for January, on our side".<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
== Other authorities ==
<!-- Canada's regulator -->
Canada accepted FAA's MAX certification in June 2017 under a bilateral agreement.<ref name=":17"></ref> However, Canadian Minister of Transport Garneau said in March 2019, that Transport Canada will do its own certification of Boeing's software update "even if it's certified by the FAA.".<ref name=":17" /> On October 4, 2019, the head of civil aviation for Transport Canada, said that global regulators are considering the requirements for the 737 MAX to fly again, weighing in the "startle factors" that can overwhelm pilots lacking sufficient exposure in simulation scenarios. He also said that Transport Canada raised questions over the architecture of the angle of attack system.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref> On November 19, 2019, an engineering manager in aircraft integration and safety assessment at Transport Canada emailed FAA, EASA and Brazil's National Civil Aviation Agency, calling for removal of key software from the 737 MAX by stating "The only way I see moving forward at this point is that Boeing's MCAS system has to go," although the views were at the working level and had not been subject to systematic review by Transport Canada.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
<!-- India's regulator -->
India's regulator [[Directorate General of Civil Aviation (India)|DGCA]] will conduct its own validation tests of the MAX before authorizing it in India's airspace. Arun Kumar, Director General of DGCA, said India will adopt a "wait and watch" policy and not hurry to reauthorize the plane to fly. He also said an independent validation will be performed to ensure safety and MAX pilots will have to train on a simulator. India's [[SpiceJet]] has already received 13 MAX jets and has 155 more on order.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref><ref></ref>
<!-- UAE's regulator -->
The UAE's director general of the [[General Civil Aviation Authority]] (GCAA), Said Mohammed al-Suwaidi, announced GCAA will conduct its own assessment, rather than follow the FAA. The UAE regulator had yet not seen Boeing's fixes in detail.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref> He did not expect the 737 MAX to be back in service in 2019.<ref></ref>
<!-- Australia's regulator -->
Australia's [[Civil Aviation Safety Authority]] said that the FAA decision would be an important factor in allowing the MAX to fly, but CASA will make its own decision.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref> In October 2019 [[SilkAir]] flew its six 737 MAXs from [[Singapore Changi Airport|Singapore]] to [[Alice Springs Airport]] for storage during Singapore's wet season.<ref>[https://ift.tt/2oOfxcr Alice Springs plane graveyard to house Silk Air's grounded Boeing 737 MAX 8 planes] ''[[ABC News (Australia)]]'' October 1, 2019</ref>
<!-- Brazil's regulator -->
According to the first Brazil's government statement on the MAX issue, the [[National Civil Aviation Agency of Brazil]] (ANAC) has been working closely with the FAA on getting the airplane back into service by the end of 2019. It is worth noting that Brazil's largest domestic airline, [[Gol Transportes Aéreos]], is a major MAX customer with an order over 100 aircraft.<ref></ref>
== Certification activities ==
In early October, CEO Muilenburg said that Boeing's own test pilots had completed more than 700 flights with the MAX.<ref name="EASA on proposed fixes" /> As of October 28, Boeing had conducted "over 800 test and production flights with the updated MCAS software, totaling more than 1,500 hours".<ref></ref>
Certification flight tests, because of the ongoing safety review, are unlikely before November.<ref name="Reuters">Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
Boeing made "dry runs" of the certification test flights on October 17, 2019.<ref> Aviation}}</ref>
In December 2019, ''The Air Current'' reported on pilots attempting the procedure with "inconsistent, confusing" results.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
The FAA has identified new risks of failure during thorough testing. As a result, Boeing will make the overall flight-control computer more redundant and both computers will operate on each flight instead of alternating between flights. The planes were said to be unlikely to resume operations until 2020.<ref name="WSJ_20190802"></ref><ref name="WSJ_20190714"></ref><ref name="Seattle Times 20190801">Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref> On October 8, Boeing was fixing a flaw discovered in the redundant-computer architecture of the 737 MAX flight-control system.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
, the FAA and the EASA were still reviewing changes to the MAX software, raising questions about the return to service forecast. The FAA will review Boeing's "final system description", which specifies the architecture of the flight control system and the changes that Boeing have made, and perform an "integrated system safety analysis"; the updated avionics will be assessed for pilot workload.<ref name="Reuters"/> The FAA is specifically looking at six "non-normal" checklists that could be resequenced or changed. The assessment of these checklists with pilots could happen at the end of October, according to an optimistic forecast.<ref name=":35">Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
Final simulator-based assessments are expected to start in November.<ref name="cnn.com"/> On October 22, FAA Administrator Steve Dickson said in news conference that the agency has received the "final software load" and "complete system description" of revisions; several weeks of work are anticipated for certification activities.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
As of mid-November, Boeing still needed to complete an audit of its software documentation. A key certification test flight will follow the audit. In a memo and a video dated November 14, FAA's Steve Dickson instructed his staff to "take whatever time is needed" in their review, repeating that approval is "not guided by a calendar or schedule."<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref><ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
On December 6, 2019, the FAA posted an updated [[Master minimum equipment list]] for the 737 MAX; in particular, both flight computers must be operational before flight, as they now compare each other's sensors prior to activating MCAS.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (given 1, expected 2)</ref>
== References ==
[[Category:2019 in aviation]]
[[Category:Boeing]]
February 23, 2020 at 02:48AM
