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Eliana La Ferrara
Arbraxan: New entry Eliana La Ferrara
'''Eliana La Ferrara''' is an [[Italy|Italian]] [[economist]] who currently (February 2018) holds the Fondazione Romeo ed Enrica Invernizzi Chair in Development Economics at [[Bocconi University]], where she also acts as Scientific Director of the Laboratory for Effective Anti-poverty Programs (LEAP).<ref>[http://ift.tt/2C9lYI1 Webpage of Eliana La Ferrara at Bocconi University. Retrieved February 10th, 2018.]</ref> Moreover, she is the current president of the [[Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development]] (BREAD)<ref>[http://ift.tt/2Eid29c People at BREAD. Retrieved February 10th, 2018.]</ref> as well as the president of the [[European Economic Association]].<ref>[http://ift.tt/2C9lZf3 EEA Officers 2018. Retrieved February 10th, 2018.]</ref> In terms of research, her fields of interest include [[development economics]], [[political economy]], and [[public economics]].<ref>[http://ift.tt/2Eiec4i Access to Eliana La Ferrara's CV on the website of Bocconi University. Retrieved February 10th, 2018.]</ref>
== Biography==
Eliana La Ferrara earned [[Laurea]] in economics and social sciences as well as a [[Dottorato di ricerca|research doctorate]] in economics from [[Bocconi University]] in 1993 and 1997, respectively. Thereafter, she also earned a [[Ph.D.]] from [[Harvard University]] in 1999. Since 1998, La Ferrara has mostly worked at Bocconi University, where she currently holds the Fondazone Romeo ed Enrica Invernizzi Chair in Development Economics and acts as Scientific Director of the Laboratory for Effective Anti-Poverty Policies. Additionally, she has held various visiting appointments at the [[University of Namur]] (2006), the [[University of Oslo]] (2012,2013), and [[Massachusetts Institute of Technology|MIT]] (2012-13), and was the BP Centennial Professor at the [[London School of Economics]] in 2017-18. In terms of professional affiliations, La Ferrara currently holds the positions of president of the [[Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development]] (BREAD),<ref>[http://ift.tt/2Eid29c People at BREAD. Retrieved February 10th, 2018.]</ref> president of the [[European Economic Association]] (EEA),<ref>[http://ift.tt/2C9lZf3 EEA Officers 2018. Retrieved February 10th, 2018.]</ref> is a member of the executive committee of the [[European Development Research Network]] (EUDN),<ref>[http://ift.tt/2C9lZM5 Executive Committee of EUDN. Retrieved February 10th, 2018.]</ref> and a co-director of the State research programme at the [[International Growth Centre]] (IGC).<ref>[http://ift.tt/2EhjFbV Profile of Eliana La Ferrara at IGC. Retrieved February 10th, 2018.]</ref> Furthermore, she is also affiliated with the [[Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research]] (IGIER),<ref>[http://ift.tt/2C8OpG3 List of fellows at IGIER. Retrieved February 10th, 2018.]</ref> [[Centre for Economic Policy Research|CPER]],<ref>[http://ift.tt/2EiZnih Profile of Eliana La Ferrara at CEPR. Retrieved February 10th, 2018.]</ref> the [[Econometric Society]],<ref>[http://ift.tt/2C9m02B Profile of Eliana La Ferrara at the Econometric Society. Retrieved February 10th, 2018.]</ref> and the [[Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab]] (J-PAL) at MIT.<ref>[http://ift.tt/2EhFwzR Profile of Eliana La Ferrara at J-PAL. Retrieved February 10th, 2018.]</ref> Finally, in terms of professional service, she also performs editorial duties at the ''[[Journal of African Economies]]'',<ref>[http://ift.tt/2CbRQvE Editorial board of the Journal of African Economies. Retrieved February 10th, 2018.]</ref> ''[[Economica]]'',<ref>[http://ift.tt/2EhCFad Editorial board of ''Economica''. Retrieved February 10th, 2018.]</ref> and ''[[World Development (journal)|World Development]]''.<ref>[http://ift.tt/2C9m16F Editorial board of ''World Development''. Retrieved February 10th, 2018.]</ref>
== Research==
Her research focuses on the economics of institutions, social norms, media, conflict and ethnicity.<ref>[http://ift.tt/2EhFwzR Profile of Eliana La Ferrara at J-PAL. Retrieved February 10th, 2018.]</ref> According to [[IDEAS/RePEc]], she belongs to the 2% of most cited economists.<ref>[http://ift.tt/2EfW5fs Ranking of economists at IDEAS/RePEc.]</ref> Key areas of her research include the following:<ref>[http://ift.tt/2C9Jm8g See Eliana La Ferrara's IDEAS profile for a comprehensive list of publications.]</ref>
=== The economics of ethnic diversity and economic inequality: Participation and trust===
How does a community's heterogeneity (i.e. how different individuals in a community are in terms of e.g. income or ethnicity) affect the formation of groups, participation in social activities, trust in others, and reciprocity? Investigating the effect of heterogeneity on group formation and participation in social activities in [[United States|U.S.]] communities, La Ferrara and [[Alberto Alesina]] find that social participation is lower the more unequal and ethnically diverse a community is. Moreover, individuals who oppose racial mixing tend to be increasingly isolated the more racially diverse their community is.<ref>[http://ift.tt/2EiZpqp Alesina, A., La Ferrara, E. (2000). Participation in Heterogeneous Communities. ''Quarterly Journal of Economics'', 115(3), pp. 847-904.]</ref> Interestingly, despite very different standards of living, the effect of income inequality seems also to hold in [[developing countries]]: in rural [[Tanzania]], La Ferrara finds that village-level inequality overall decreases participation in groups, especially for relatively wealthy people. However, she also finds that this aggregate effect masks the importance of whether access to groups is open or restricted: if the growth in inequality is mostly due to some of the very poor becoming slightly wealthier, participation in open groups decreases, but if the growth in inequality is instead driven by average income earners becoming relatively wealthy participation in groups with restricted access increases, with both processes affecting group functioning.
<ref>[http://ift.tt/2CaKEQc La Ferrara, E. (2002). Inequality and group participation: theory and evidence from rural Tanzania. ''Journal of Public Economics'', 85(2), pp. 235-273.]</ref> One channel through which a community's diversity affects its social life is through the trust (or lack thereof) between its members. In the U.S., La Ferrara and Alesina find that low trust of others is pervasive among individuals who (i) live in a racially mixed and/or highly unequal community, (ii) are members in a group that has historically been discriminated against (e.g. [[African American]]s and, to a lesser degree, women), (iii) are unsuccessful in terms of income and education, and/or (iv) recently had a series of traumatic experiences; by contrast, religious beliefs or ethnic origins don't affect trust of others.<ref>[http://ift.tt/2EiXVMM Alesina, A., La Ferrara, E. (2002). Who trusts others? ''Journal of Public Economics'', 85(2), pp. 207-234.]</ref>
=== The economics of conflict: The relationship between violent conflict and financial markets===
In another strand of her research, Eliana La Ferrara studies the relationship between [[violent conflict]] and [[financial market]]s, e.g. to develop a method to detect illegal arms trade, to analyse whether violent conflict is bad for private firms, and how financial markets react to the news of violent conflict:
How to detect illegal arms trade? Eliana La Ferrara and [[Stefano DellaVigna]] speculate that events that affect the intensity of violent conflicts (and, by extension, the demand for arms) in countries which are under international arms embargos may be reflected in arms manufacturers' stock prices if they are violating these embargos. Investigating this hypothesis, they show that the stock returns of arms manufacturers headquartered in highly corrupt countries with an intransparent arms trade business indeed mirror these events and are able to substantiate many of these links through [[United Nations|UN]] investigations and online news stories.<ref>[http://ift.tt/2CbzydP DellaVigna, S., La Ferrara, E. (2010). Detecting Illegal Arms Trade. ''American Economic Journal: Economic Policy'', 2(4), pp. 26-57.]</ref>
Is violent conflict bad for private firms? In their study of the impact of the sudden, unexpected end of the [[Angolan Civil War]] in 2002 (due to the death of [[UNITA]] rebel leader [[Jonas Savimbi]]), La Ferrara and Massimo Guidolin find that the event caused the abnormal returns of diamond mining firms holding concessions in [[Angola]] to decrease by 4pp but had no effect on diamond mining companies not active in Angola. In light of this finding, La Ferrara and Guidolin suggest that violent conflict may benefit incumbent firms in the extractive sector by creating additional barriers to market entry, weakening governments' bargaining power with regard to the distribution of natural resource rents, and making the licensing of mining concessions less transparent. <ref>[http://ift.tt/2EfW7nA Guidolin, M., La Ferrara, E. (2007). Diamonds Are Forever, Wars Are Not: Is Conflict Bad for Private Firms? ''American Economic Review'', 97(5), pp. 1978-1993.]</ref> In another study on the relationship between violent conflicts and financial markets, La Ferrara and Guidolin find that for 101 violent conflicts during 1974-2004, MSCI stock indices of the U.S., [[United Kingdom|British]], and [[French]] stock markets, overall commodity indices (though not for oil futures, agricultural products or gold), and the U.S. dollar exchange rate tend, on average, to react positively to the news of conflict onset, whereas stock markets in [[Japan]] as well as indices of agricultural commodities, oil futures and gold don't. In general, stock markets tend to react particularly strongly to news of international conflicts as well as to news of conflicts in Asia and the Middle East, the latter being driven by the extremely strong (and mostly negative) reactions of oil futures.<ref>[http://ift.tt/2C9lu4F Guidolin, M., La Ferrara, E. (2010). The economic effects of violent conflict: Evidence from asset market reactions. ''Journal of Peace Research'', 47(6), pp. 671-684.]</ref>
=== The economics of media: The impact of television on social norms in Brazil===
How does exposure to alternative [[social norm]]s affect local norms and attitudes? Together with Alberto Chong, Eliana La Ferrara exploits the gradual expansion of the television network [[Rede Globo]] across [[Brazil]] in the 1970s and 1980s to explore whether exposure to [[Rede Globo telenovelas]], which tend to portray modern social norms (including the possibility of divorce) had an effect on divorces. Indeed, La Ferrara and Chong find that the availability of the Globo signal significantly increases the share of separated or divorced couples.<ref>[http://ift.tt/2EgUiqv Chong, A., La Ferrara, E. (2009). Television and Divorce: Evidence from Brazilian Novelas. ''Journal of the European Economic Association'', 458-468.]</ref> In another study but again exploiting Rede Globo's gradual expansion in Brazil, La Ferrara, Chong and Suzanne Duryea analyse the impact of Globo's telenovelas, which also portray comparatively small families, on fertility and find a significant negative impact, with the effect of Globo's telenovelas on parents being further substantiated by the fact that the frequency of child names in regions with access to Globo strongly reflects naming patterns in the telenovelas. The effect of the soap operas on fertility is particularly strong for women from poor households and during the central and late phases of fertility, thus suggesting that households adjusted their views regarding the desired number of children and stopped having more children after reaching it.<ref>[http://ift.tt/2Cac8FX La Ferrara, E., Chong, A., Duryea, S. (2012). Soap Operas and Fertility: Evidence from Brazil. ''American Economic Journal: Applied Economics'', 4(4), pp. 1-31.]</ref>
=== Miscellany===
What role does reciprocity play in kinship based networks? In her study of informal credit transactions within kinship based networks in [[Ghana]], La Ferrara finds that repayment of loans is effectively induced through social enforcement, e.g. the sanctioning of defaulters' offspring, and that kin members sometimes condition their lending behaviour (e.g. offer favourable terms of credit) on the characteristics of a creditor's parents in the expectation that others will do the same with their offspring.<ref>[http://ift.tt/2C9Jm8g La Ferrara, E. (2003). Kin Groups and Reciprocity: A Model of Credit Transactions in Ghana. ''American Economic Review'', 93(5), pp. 1730-1751.]</ref>
How do individual preferences for redistribution depend on future income prospects? Alesina and La Ferrara find that preferences for redistribution in the U.S. depend considerably on individuals' expected gains and losses from redistribution (which are strongly determined by their socioeconomic background) but also by their subjective beliefs about individual economic agency, i.e. people who don't believe that American society offers "equal opportunities" for social mobility are less averse to redistribution.<ref>[http://ift.tt/2EhCDiB Alesina, A., La Ferrara, E. (2005). Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities. ''Journal of Public Economics'', 89(5-6), pp. 897-931.]</ref>
== Selected publications==
* [http://ift.tt/2C8gOfb Alesina, A., La Ferrara, E. (2005). Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance. ''Journal of Economic Literature'', 43(3), pp. 762-800.]
== References==
== External links==
[http://ift.tt/2EieckO Personal page of Eliana La Ferrara at Bocconi University]
[[Category:Italian economists]]
[[Category:Bocconi University faculty]]
[[Category:Harvard University alumni]]
[[Category:Bocconi University alumni]]
[[Category:Development economists]]
[[Category:Political economists]]
[[Category:Fellows of the Econometric Society]]
[[Category:Living people]]
February 10, 2018 at 08:42PM
